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RECENT CASES
CORPORATIONS - FARMING BAN - REASONABLY NECESSARY Ex-
CEPTIONS-The Secretary of State refused to approve the plaintiff's
articles of incorporation because they were in conflict with chapter
10-06 of the North Dakota Century Code. The corporation was being
expressly incorporated to conduct the business of farming, and
the articles were refused on the ground that the purpose of the
proposed corporation was prohibited by law.'
The plaintiff brought an action in the district court to compel
the Secretary of State to approve the proposed articles. In granting
a summary judgment for the plaintiff, the court held that the
purpose of the corporation was a valid and legal purpose within
the express exception contained in the statute.2 The district court's
decision stated that chapter 10-06 of the North Dakota Century
Code prohibits a corporation from holding and farming rural real
estate only when such real estate is not reasonably necessary for
the conduct of its business.' The court reasoned that the owning
of rural real estate is not only reasonably necessary, but is an
indispensable prerequisite to a corporation engaging in farming. 4
The North Dakota Supreme Court, in reversing the judgment
said, "the prohibition contained in section 10-06-01 [North Dakota
Century Code] enjoins the business of farming or agriculture by
corporations. Thus, . . . all corporations, . . . except co-operative
corporations, 75% of whose members or stockholders are actual
farmers residing on farms or depending principally on farming
for their livelihood, are prohibited from engaging in the business
of farming. '" Coal Harbor Stock Farm, Inc. v. Meier, 191 N.W.2d
583 (N.D. 1971).
Three basic approaches have been utililized by states enacting
laws limiting corporate ownership of rural realty. Briefly stated,
the three types are: (1) An absolute prohibition; 6 (2) limiting
1. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-06-01 and 10-19-54 (1960).
Section 10-19-54 provides that matters set forth in the articles of incorporation
shall be in conformity with law, and section 10-06-01 prohibits corporate farming
subject to the exceptions provided for in chapter 10-06.
2. Coal Harbor Stock Farm Inc. v. Meier, 191 N.W.2d 583, 586 (N.D. 1971).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 587.
6. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-202(a) (1949), provides that no corporation shall
be formed to raise wheat, corn, barley, oats, rye, potatoes, or to milk cows for dairy
purposes.
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the acreage a corporation may hold; 7 and (3) limiting the cor-
porate holding to an amount necessary to accomplish the corporate
purposes .8
It is this third approach that North Dakota has adopted in
their attempt to limit corporate farming. Statutes falling into this
third group, allow corporations to hold rural realty which is neces-
sary and proper9 or reasonably necessary 0 to the corporate pur-
pose. Oklahoma, which allows a corporation to hold realty which
is necessary and proper,1 was recently faced with a situation
similar to that presented in Coal Harbor. The Oklahoma Supreme
Court, in approving corporate farming12 predicated their decision
on a finding that the legislative intent was to prohibit real estate
corporations, not corporate farms.
1
The ambiguity of the "reasonably necessary exception' 4 clause
in chapter 10-06 of the North Dakota Century Code, can be readily
observed by a look at the provisions of the chapter. 5 An obvious
reaction, prior to Coal Harbor, was one of uncertainty. 0
In upholding the corporate farming ban, the court clarified
inferences made in the two prior cases that reached the North
Dakota Supreme Court involving the Corporate Farming Act. The
7. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 500.22(3) (1961):
"[N]o corporation organized for and engaged in any farming operations, shall
acquire more than 5000 acres of land."
8. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 10-06 (1960).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1.20(a), (b)(1) (1961).
(a) No corporation of any sort . . . shall, except as herein provided,
own, hold, or take any real estate located in this State outside of any
incorporated city or town or any addition thereto.
(b) Nothing in this act shall be construed as prohibiting the owning,
holding, or taking of:
(1) such real estate as Is necessary and proper for
carrying on the business for which any corporation has been
lawfully formed ...
9. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.20(b)(1) (1969).
10. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-06-02, -03, -06 (1960).
11. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.20(b) (1) (1961).
12. Leforce v. Ballard, 454 P.2d 297 (Okla. 1969).
13. Id.
14. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-06-02, -03, -06 (1960).
These sections contain "reasonably necessary exceptions."
15. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 10-06 (1960).
In brief this chapter provides that:
§10-06-01. All corporations, both domestic and foreign, except as
otherwise provided for in this chapter are hereby prohibited from engag-
ing in the business of farming or agriculture.
§10-06-02. All corporations must dispose of all rural real estate, ex-
cept such as is reasonably necessary in the conduct of their business before
July 29, 1942.
§10-06-03. All such lands acquired after July 29, 1932 shall be dis-
posed of within ten years, except as is reasonably necessary in the conduct of
its business. During the ten year period such land may be used for
agricultural purposes.
§10-06-04. Co-operative corporations, 75 percent of whose members live
on farms or depend principally on farming are exempt.
§10-06-06. Corporations not disposing of land which is not reasonably
necessary . . . shall hold such subject to escheat provisions.
16. See McElroy, North Dakota's Anti-Corporate Farming Act, 36 N.D. L. REv.
96 (1960). Contra, O'Keefe, The North Dakota Anti-Corporate Farming Act: A Dia-
senting Opinion, 41 N.D. L. REv. 333 (1965).
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first of these, Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, 1 7 involved a hospital
that was a non-profit corporation, organized under Minnesota law.
The corporation owned a quarter section of land in North Dakota
that had been acquired in 1925. Plaintiff was not in the farming
business, but the property was farmed under a lease agreement.
In the litigation, the plaintiff sought to establish the importance
of the fact that their charter allowed ownership of land.1 8 It con-
tended that the requirement that a corporation dispose of rural
real estate within ten years, did not apply to any real property
that was owned by a corporation which had authority under its
articles of incorporatin to own and hold land. The court, dismissing
this distinction, held that the corporate farming law applied to
non-farming corporations which incidentally owned and farmed rural
land. They further held:
When the statute provides that there shall be excepted from
its operation such real estate 'as is reasonably necessary
in the conduct of' the business of the corporation, it means
such real estate as is reasonably necessary for carrying on
the business or activity which the corporation was created
to carry on.' 9 (Emphasis added)
It seems implicit in the holding, that the ban would affect corpora-
tions expressly organized to farm since the business they would
be created to carry on would be in direct contravention of the
provision prohibiting corporate farming.
20
The second case to interpret Chapter 10-06 was Loy v. Kessler.21
This was a quiet title action with the corporate farming law involved
as a secondary issue. The defendants contended that the deed was
void because a corporation was prohibited from acquiring title to
land. In rejecting this contention, the court found that the original
act contained a specific prohibition on acquisition of land by a
corporation 22 and that this provision was deleted by a subsequent
amendment.2 The court also reasoned that since escheat can apply
only to lands in which title is held, 24 the formidable escheat pro-
visions of chapter 10-0625 was also evidence of the corporation
17. Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, 72 N.D. 359, 7 N.W.2d 438 (1943); Asbury
Hospital v. Cass County, 73 N.D. 469, 16 N.W.2d 523 (1944).
18. Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, 72 N.D. 359, 7 N.W.2d 438, 447 (1943).
The plaintiff contended that the statute applied only in cases where the owning of
property was ultra vires to the corporation. The court held that the statute presupposes
that the land was acquired and held lawfully.
19. Id.
20. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-06-01 (1960).
21. Loy v. Kessler, 76 N.D. 738, 39 N.W.2d 260, 270 (1949).
22. N.D. SEss. LAws 494 (1933).
23. Id. at ch. 89, § 1.
24. Loy v. Kessler, 76 N.D. 738, 39 N.W.2d 260, 272 (1949). "Escheat can apply
only to lands to which the corporation has acquired title."
25. N.D. CENT. CODE 8 10-06-06 (1960).
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right to hold title. Based on these two reasons the court in Loy
held that the act did not expressly prohibit corporations from
acquiring title to farm land.
The confusion surrounding North Dakota's Corporate Farming
Act 26 after these two cases, is aptly demonstrated by the interpreta-
tion given by two earlier writers on the subject. One writer, in
an analysis of Asbury, indicates that the Corporate Farming Act
may not be a ban on all corporate farming. 27 Asbury was a char-
tered hospital, and there was nothing in its purpose clause to
give it power to own, manage or hold real estate of any kind.
28
Its only right to hold land was derived from the general powers
given non-profit corporations under the laws of the State of Min-
nesota. It was in no position to assert that owning rural realty
was reasonably necessary to running a hospital.
2
1
The article further pointed out that Loy expressly held that "a
corporation may acquire and hold indefinitely real estate that is
otherwise within the prohibited category if it is reasonably neces-
sary in the conduct of its business."2 0 The implication of this
article is that a corporation, setting forth in its articles of incorpora-
tion the purpose to engage in the business of farming, is in a position
to assert that owning rural real estate is reasonably necessary,
and if so, they may hold the land indefinitely under the decision
in Loy.
Another writer, after analyzing the same two cases came up
with an opposite view.2 1 In his opinion, "Corporate farming is
under no circumstances allowable." 32 He notes that if Asbury, by
implication, allowed a corporation to hold and farm rural lands
that are reasonably necessary to conduct their non-rural business,
this exception applies only to lands acquired by corporations prior
to 1932. 88 In Loy the court said the reason for the deletion of
the prohibition 4 against acquiring real estate was done to permit
corporations to pass valid and marketable titles to real estate. Thus
there was nothing to indicate the legislature's intent to relax the
ban on corporations acquiring and using rural land.85
In holding that rural real estate, which is owned by a corpora-
26. N.D. CENT. CODE Ch. 10-06 (1960).
27. McElroy, North Dakota'8 Anti-Corporate Farming Act, 36 N.D.L. REV. 96 (1960).
28. Id. at 99.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. O'Keefe, The North Dakota Anti-CorpOrate Farming Act: A Dfasentngn Opinion,
41 N.D. L. REV. 333 (1965).
32. Id. at 335.
33. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-06-03 (1960).
This section explicitly says that lands acquired after July 29, 1932 fall under its pro-
visions. If Asbury allowed a corporation to farm rural lands, it is a logical inference
that it applied only to land held prior to 1932.
34. N.D. SEss. LAWS ch. 89, § 1 (1933).
35. O'Keefe, aupra note 16, it 0.0,
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tion organized for the purpose of engaging in farming or agriculture,
does not qualify for the reasonably necessary exception, 6 the su-
preme court after more than thirty-five years of confusion has
settled the question by their decision in Coal Harbor. It seems
clear that a prospective corporation expressly designed to engage
in farming is contrary to section 10-06-01 of the North Dakota
Century Code, and as such it should not be allowed to incorporate.87
By so deciding, the court impliedly found that the legislative intent
was to prohibit corporate farming. It is implicit in such a decision,
that any future change in the law, relaxing the ban on corporate
farming, should come from legislative action and not judicial in-
novation.
It has been suggested that a corporation need only dispose
of all land not reasonably necessary once every ten years, repur-
chase later, and thereby avoid the escheat provisions.8 In so doing,
it is contended that it is possible to effectively circumvent the
corporate farming ban.8 9 There is an obvious fault in this reasoning.
Since the supreme court has determined the legislative intent to
ban corporate farming, a method of circumventing the law resulting
in an abrogation of both the spirit and the letter of the law,
is a proper place for judicial action. The courts must enforce
the spirit, as well as the letter of the law, until the legislature
deems it proper to act.
Apparently after Coal Harbor, the only way for the farmer
to enjoy the basic advantages of incorporation 4 0 is to attempt
to qualify for the co-operative corporation exception. 41 Since cor-
porate farming is now under no circumstances allowable, this seems
the obvious means to achieve the desired result.
ORELL D. SCHMITZ
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS-EQUAL PRO-
TECTION FOR NONRESIDENT BAR APPLICANTS-Plaintiff brought a
class action in Federal District Court seeking an injunction against
the enforcement of a state statute requiring bar applicants to es-
36. Coal Iarbor Stock Farm, Inc. v. Meier, 191 N.W.2d 583, 588 (N.D. 1971).
37. N.D. CENT. CoDs § 10-19-54 (1960) (matters set forth in articles of incorporation
shall be in conformity with law).
38. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-06-06 (1960).
39. Appellants Brief, at 11. Coal Harbor Stock Farm, Inc. v. Meier, 191 N.W.2d 583
(N.D. 1971).
40. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-15-31 (1960). This section provides foe limited liability.
For an excellent analysis of the tax benefits see Pearson, The Farm Co-operative and
the Federal Income Tax, 4.4 N.D. L. RLv. 490 (1968).
41. N.D. CENT. CoDE § 10-06-04 (1960).
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